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Animals including humans engage in goal-directed behavior flexibly in response to items
and their background, which is called contextual behavior in this review. Although the
concept of context has long been studied, there are differences among researchers
in defining and experimenting with the concept. The current review aims to provide
a categorical framework within which not only the neural mechanisms of contextual
information processing but also the contextual behavior can be studied in more concrete
ways. For this purpose, we categorize contextual behavior into three subcategories as
follows by considering the types of interactions among context, item, and response:
contextual response selection, contextual item selection, and contextual item–response
selection. Contextual response selection refers to the animal emitting different types of
responses to the same item depending on the context in the background. Contextual
item selection occurs when there are multiple items that need to be chosen in a
contextual manner. Finally, when multiple items and multiple contexts are involved,
contextual item–response selection takes place whereby the animal either chooses an
item or inhibits such a response depending on item–context paired association. The
literature suggests that the rhinal cortical regions and the hippocampal formation play key
roles in mnemonically categorizing and recognizing contextual representations and the
associated items. In addition, it appears that the fronto-striatal cortical loops in connection
with the contextual information-processing areas critically control the flexible deployment
of adaptive action sets and motor responses for maximizing goals. We suggest that
contextual information processing should be investigated in experimental settings where
contextual stimuli and resulting behaviors are clearly defined and measurable, considering
the dynamic top-down and bottom-up interactions among the neural systems for
contextual behavior.
Keywords: hippocampus, context, perirhinal cortex, post-rhinal cortex, entorhinal cortex, response selection,
choice behavior, decision making
CONTEXT AND CONTEXTUAL BEHAVIOR
Animals including humans recognize their surrounding environ-
ment rapidly and with seeming ease. A surrounding environment
often influences which information needs to be attentively pro-
cessed in certain ways and also determines an appropriate action
set or behavioral repertoire (Figure 1). That is, the surrounding
environment often determines themodus operandi of the brain. In
the absence of such powerful information that effectively sets up
the global mode of operation in the brain, physical stimuli in the
ever-changing and complex world should produce insurmount-
able ambiguity and confusion in neural information processing
and resulting behavior. In the current review, we will selectively
review prior studies including our own that can speak to how
the brain enables an animal to learn and remember to respond
appropriately in a contextual manner.
DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF CONTEXT AND CONTEXTUAL
BEHAVIOR
What is context? There are many contexts one may encounter
during lifetime and there are as many definitions of the term
as well. Context is hardly a scientific term. It is often casually
used in layman’s conversation to loosely refer to a set of physical
and cognitive factors that determine the meaning of an other-
wise ambiguous element(s) associated with those factors. When
a behavioral response to such an element is influenced by those
peripherally related factors, one may call it a contextual behav-
ior. The purpose of the current review is to provide a perspective
on how contextual system interacts with different neural systems
for response, such as item information-processing systems and
motor action systems (see below). Therefore, we would not be
able to provide an extensive review of the literature on context,
but briefly mentioning some related contents from the literature
would nonetheless be helpful.
The concept of contextual stimuli was first brought to learn-
ing and memory research as learning theories developed largely
within the framework of classical and instrumental conditioning
(Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). At that time, context was consid-
ered largely as stimuli in the background that can be processed by
the same learning principles as for elemental cues (e.g., light, tone,
etc.) in an apparatus. A context, in this case, refers to background
stimuli that are not directly manipulated in the experiment as
opposed to phasic stimuli such as tone and light that serve as a
direct predictor of reward. Defining context in this manner could
potentially be problematic because the concept is defined by what
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FIGURE 1 | A cartoon for illustrating the importance of contextual
interpretation of items for choice behavior. Rodents usually avoid novel
objects (cheese over the trap in this example) paired with a surrounding
context to stay away from danger.
is not (i.e., foreground phasic stimulus) rather than by what it
is. In most cases, a single elemental stimulus (e.g., an object, an
odor, a single tone, etc.) presented as a cue in an experiment is
not normally called a context. In contrast, a set of many objects,
for example, whose individual parts one may not be able to easily
and rapidly recognize in the background may be called a con-
text. That is, contextual information is “multiplex” by nature. The
threshold that separates the two states (i.e., elemental vs. contex-
tual stimuli), however, may not be clearly defined just by counting
the number of elemental stimuli included. Nadel and Wilner thus
proposed another important dimension of context that may com-
pensate for this and that was whether a stimulus was phasic or
tonic in terms of frequency of change (Nadel and Wilner, 1980;
Nadel, 2008).
The above properties of context (i.e., static background com-
posed of multiple elemental cues) are largely associated with the
physical nature of stimuli (i.e., multiplexed information content
and temporal duration and frequency of occurrence). On the
other hand, more functional definitions of context were pro-
posed by several researchers (Hirsh, 1974; Good and Honey,
1991; Myers and Gluck, 1994). Hirsh (1974), for example, pro-
posed for the first time that the hippocampus was involved in
retrieving contextual memory. According to Hirsh’s theory, an
external stimulus (S) elicits a specific response (R) and such S–R
association chains are stored and expressed through a so-called
“performance line.” For example, when a rat learns to press a bar
to obtain reward, the association between the bar and pressing
response is stored through a performance line. Hirsh argued that
the contextual memory system influenced the information flow
in the performance line so that, for example, bar-pressing behav-
ior could become more prominent when the rat performed the
task in the same context in which it had been trained, compared
to a different context. According to his model, therefore, contex-
tual memory works as a gatekeeper for retrieving S–R memories
flexibly in consideration of the surrounding background, and the
absence of the hippocampus leaves the animal with fixed and rigid
S–R memories only. The hypothesized modulatory function of
context during memory retrieval may be considered similar to
the “occasion setting” property of a stimulus in classical condi-
tioning literature (Holland, 1985; Yoon et al., 2011). For example,
if a tone stimulus leads to reinforcement only when it is preceded
by a light stimulus, but not when the tone is presented by itself,
then the light sets the “occasion” for reinforcement. When a con-
textual stimulus in the background functions as a gatekeeper, the
context may be called an occasion setter also (Myers and Gluck,
1994; Yoon et al., 2011). However, in this review, we will use the
term context instead of occasion setter because the occasion set-
ting hypothesis does not necessarily require the occasion-setting
stimulus to be multiplexed as for context. That is, an elemental
stimulus may well function as an occasion setter. Since different
neural systems are likely to be recruited depending on the nature
of the stimulus, this distinction between elemental stimulus and
multiplexed stimulus (i.e., context) is important.
Removing the hippocampus may result in rigid and inflexi-
ble S–R memory systems, which would be equivalent to having
only habit memory systems (Graybiel, 2008). Hippocampal-
lesioned animals indeed show perseverative behavior (Whishaw
and Tomie, 1997) and this reemphasizes the importance of con-
textual information. Specifically, one of the biggest problems of
having only the rigid S–R memory system would be not being
able to deal with ambiguous stimuli. For example, when a par-
ticular stimulus results in reward in one context, but not in
another environment, the same stimulus now possesses ambiva-
lent or conflicting reward values. In other cases, a stimulus may
be presented in an incomplete or noisy form. In these cases, the
surrounding background information is vital for resolving the
ambiguity associated with the stimulus. That is, a context solves
“predictable ambiguity” (Morris, 2007). Once context resolves
ambiguity, a more decisive action can be made. Clearing ambi-
guity for achieving decisiveness and speed also occurs not only
on the motor action side, but also in stimulus processing because
there should be contextual top-down influence on how individual
stimuli in the environment should be processed (in conjunction
with relevant motivational and emotional states as well as rules
and strategies). Context, therefore, provides a unifying cognitive
framework in the brain from stimulus interpretation to behavior.
In the current review, we will define the term context as fol-
lows. Context refers to an external physical stimulus that is present
in the animal’s background and is multiplex (i.e., composed
of complex elemental information), and it should be directly
associated with purposeful behavior. By restricting the scope of
definition to external and physical stimuli, we intend not to
include non-environmental internal variables such as rule, strat-
egy, sequence, motivation, drug state, linguistic variables, etc.,
as examples of context (Oler and Markus, 2000; Bouton, 2002;
Kennedy and Shapiro, 2004; Smith and Mizumori, 2006). This
is mainly because, as Nadel pointed out in his review (Nadel,
2008), the same internal states (e.g., hunger or thirst) can often be
associated with different (sometimes orthogonal) external envi-
ronments and this makes the concept of context unnecessarily
complex and fuzzy. Good and Honey, showed that hippocam-
pal lesioned subjects were impaired in learning that a given
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elemental stimulus was differentially associated with reinforce-
ment in different contexts (Skinner boxes housed in different
rooms with different odors and wallpapers) (Good and Honey,
1991). The example of context in the Good and Honey study can
be defined strictly based on physical stimuli in the background
and may well fit the definition of context in this review. We do
not, however, presuppose that a context should be always multi-
modal. A context should be multiplex in nature; that is, it should
be composed of multiple elemental cues but may not be easily
decomposable into elemental cues, and it should thus be fairly
complex and cohesive. This also relates to the functional def-
inition and that is, for a well-constructed contextual stimulus,
learning to respond in a particular way in association with a single
element in the context should lead to suboptimal or counterpro-
ductive results in most cases. For example, when the rat is trained
to use multiple external cues in the distal background for retriev-
ing a spatial location, the multiple distal cues can be considered
as context and normal rats can effectively retrieve location mem-
ory when some elemental cues in the context are missing (Gold
and Kesner, 2005). However, rats with hippocampal lesions are
markedly impaired as the distal background loses some elemental
cues, suggesting that the rats without the hippocampi use individ-
ual cues instead of using the entire cues as a whole as a context.
In other words, contextual effects on behavior should be maximal
when the contextual stimulus is processed as a Gestalt rather than
as a linear sum of elemental stimuli. Fanselow (1986) has noted
that it takes time to develop a contextual representation because
of this nature as opposed to elemental stimuli. The constraint
that a context should remain in the background is important as
Smith defined a context “that which surrounds” (Smith, 2007).
Remaining in the background can operationally be defined as the
contextual stimulus not becoming the direct target of response.
By this definition, therefore, when the rat swims toward a large
patterned visual cue in a modified water maze to reach the plat-
form placed directly underneath the cue (Prusky et al., 2004),
such visual cues will not be considered as a context in this review
because the visual cue in that case is a target stimulus itself and
does not serve as a background. Using visual patterns in this way
(i.e., foreground target for response) also does not powerfully
recruit the hippocampus either (Kim et al., 2012; Lee and Lee,
2012). We do not necessarily require a context to be completely
static because the surrounding background perceptually changes
all the time in real life to varying degrees especially when the
animal moves across different environments. Although the hip-
pocampus is involved in the tasks that include aforementioned
contextual stimuli as critical components (O’Keefe and Nadel,
1978; Good and Honey, 1991; Penick and Solomon, 1991; Kim
and Fanselow, 1992; Phillips and Ledoux, 1992; Honey and Good,
1993), one should not fall into a circular argument by judging
whether a particular stimulus is contextual or not just based on
its dependence on the hippocampus.
With respect to contextual behavior, we will selectively review
the results from goal-directed tasks only in which a purposeful
behavioral response toward a goal (e.g., seeking for reward or
avoiding danger) is clearly predefined in relation to context (Lee
and Lee, 2012). Studies that used other behavioral paradigms
in which animals were allowed to freely forage for food (Muller
et al., 1987; Skaggs and McNaughton, 1998; Lee et al., 2004b;
Leutgeb et al., 2004) or spontaneously explore objects (Save et al.,
1992; Ennaceur et al., 1997; Vazdarjanova and Guzowski, 2004)
thus will not be covered in this review for the reasons provided
elsewhere (Lee and Lee, 2012).
CATEGORIES OF CONTEXTUAL BEHAVIOR AND BRAIN
REGIONS
As described above while selectively overviewing the literature on
contextual memory, the modulatory effect of context has been
tested traditionally by measuring changes in behavioral response
across different contexts. Such experimental paradigms thus test
not only how contextual information is represented in memory
but also how the represented contextual information is “utilized”
during action selection. Although it is likely that the same con-
textual information recruits different brain regions depending on
the type of response required (e.g., freezing, lever pressing, etc.),
literature has been focusing heavily on how contextual represen-
tation is formed and stored in the brainwith less emphasis on how
contextual memory is “used” during behavioral choice. We would
argue in this review that a more wholistic investigation of neural
circuits for contextual behavior requires understanding not only
how contextual memory is formed and retrieved, but also how
contextual information influences different types of choice behav-
ior. Therefore, contextual behavioral studies will be subdivided
into three categories in this review using the number of items and
the type of responses associated with multiple contexts as major
criteria: contextual response selection, contextual item selection, and
contextual item–response selection (Figure 2 and Table 1). In the
first category (contextual response selection), an item in the envi-
ronment is fixed but different response types toward the item
must be contextually determined. In the contextual item-selection
category, response type is fixed but the same response should
be targeted toward different items depending on which context
is associated with the items. The third category is the mixture
of both.
CONTEXTUAL RESPONSE SELECTION
Contextual response selection is required when an animal should
choose a particular behavioral response from a set of learned
behavioral choices in association with the environmental context.
This often occurs when there is no obvious elemental cue in the
environment that reliably tells the animal which behavioral choice
is appropriate or when the elemental cue present is ambiguous
(thus rendering decision making for choice behavior difficult),
but the surrounding context does the job.
Rodent studies
One of the widely spread contextual behavioral testing paradigm,
contextual freezing or fear-conditioning, requires contextual
response selection. In a typical contextual fear-conditioning
experiment (Kim and Fanselow, 1992; Phillips and Ledoux,
1992), a rat is put in an operant conditioning chamber
from which the animal can look at the surrounding visual
context (sometimes in addition to odor and sound stim-
uli in the chamber). After a few minutes of exploration in
the chamber, the rat is electrically shocked through its feet.
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FIGURE 2 | Categorization of contextual behavior. Contextual behaviors are
grouped into three categories in this review depending on the relationships
among context, item, and the animal’s response pattern to the combination of
the two. A surrounding context is symbolized as the color-gradient background
here. Contextual response selection: an animal produces different types of
responses (e.g., pushing vs. digging) to the same item depending on which
context is associated with the item. Contextual item selection: an animal gives
out the same type of responses to different items depending on the contextual
information. Contextual item–response selection: an animal responds to an
item (e.g., black item) when it is identified in one context (e.g., orange context),
but not when it is encountered in another context (e.g., blue context), and vice
versa for the other item (e.g., white item).
Table 1 | Categorization of contextual behavior.
Contextual Contextual Contextual
response item item–response
selection selection selection
Target item(s) Fixed Variable Variable
Contextual response type(s) Variable Fixed Variable
The aversive experience is then associated with the specific con-
text in which the conditioning chamber was placed because the
rat freezes (the usual behavioral measure for testing whether
the shock-context association has occurred or not) when placed
in the chamber in the same context but not when placed in
a different context. Here, response selection occurs between
non-freezing/locomotive and freezing behaviors depending on
the contextual stimuli in the background. The behavior is con-
ditioned to context rather than to elemental stimuli because
the rat freezes even when some of the elemental cues in the
environment are removed (Gonzalez et al., 2003). Also, when
the rat is not allowed to scan the room context for a proper
amount of time presumably for building a contextual repre-
sentation of the environment, it fails to show context–shock
association (Fanselow, 2000). The contextual fear-conditioning
paradigm is a good example in which a context is used directly
as a conditioning cue for behavior as compared to a modulator
for another stimulus–response association (see below in contex-
tual item–response selection). One thing that is peculiar about the
contextual fear-conditioning paradigm (compared to other con-
textual behaviors; see below) is that the behavioral response (i.e.,
freezing) is not targeted to any item in the environment because
it is presumably a self-defensive behavior (Fanselow, 1994). It is
speculated that the goals of manifesting freezing behavior are to
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avoid the movement-sensitive visual systems of predators but the
exact utility of this behavior may still need to be experimentally
verified for this paradigm to be surely categorized as a goal-
directed memory task. Besides the contextual freezing paradigm,
behavioral tasks in which rodents make discrete spatial choices
using a surrounding visual context can also be considered test-
ing contextual response selection. In an 8-arm radial maze, for
example, a rat may need to decide which arm to enter on the
basis of the distal visual contexts associated with individual arms
(Tolman et al., 1946; Olton et al., 1982; Jarrard, 1983; O’Keefe and
Speakman, 1987; Lee and Kesner, 2003; Lee and Solivan, 2008;
Jo and Lee, 2010a). As in the contextual fear conditioning, visual
context is directly associated with the animal’s response selection
(spatial response in this case as opposed to freezing).
One of the caveats of using traditional room cues as visual con-
text is that it is difficult to specify exactly which visual stimuli
are fed to the neural circuit for contextual information process-
ing. That is, although phenomenologically salient and established
well for behavioral effects, it could become a hurdle in the future
to examine how contextual information processing is realized in
neural circuits if unspecified cues (from the neural-information-
processing point of view) are called a context. As an attempt to
improve this situation, we tested previously whether the con-
figuration of specific sets of visual cues can serve as effective
contextual stimuli for directing the rat’s spatial choice behavior
to discrete locations (Kim and Lee, 2011). In a visual contextual
response-selection (VCRS) task, the rat ran along the same lin-
ear track to choose either left or right food well at the end of
the track for reward (Figure 3). The rewarding food well in each
trial was defined by the configuration (or angular relationships)
between two sets of visual cues (each set attached to the same cur-
tain). A context in this study is defined by the configuration of
two visual cue sets distally placed from the animal (which fits our
definition of context in this review since the multiplexed stim-
uli are present in the animal’s background in association with
purposeful behavior). Context-1, for example, was defined by
angular distance of 0◦ between the two distal cue sets and context-
2 was set by separating the two cue sets by 80◦. Despite the
seemingly simple nature of the task, dorsal hippocampal-lesioned
rats were severely impaired in this task compared to controls.
Inactivations in the dorsal hippocampus (using GABA-A recep-
tor agonist, muscimol, or MUS) also produced the same results.
Since the similarity between visual contexts could be parametri-
cally defined by angular distance in this paradigm, it was possible
to examine whether similar, yet novel contexts could be processed
effectively on the basis of familiar contextual memories. The dor-
sal hippocampus was critical for such capabilities (Kim and Lee,
2011).
A more sophisticated version (in terms of stimulus control)
of the VCRS task was developed later in our laboratory, using
touchscreen and LCDmonitors (Kim et al., 2012). Specifically, we
designed a task in which two-dimensional patterned visual stim-
uli were presented in the background via LCD screens (Figure 4).
In the task, the rat ran along a linear track and encountered a
touchscreen monitor at the end of the track. The rat was required
to touch one of the adjacent rectangular box images depending
on the visual contextual stimuli displayed in the two peripheral
visual context A
visual context B
FIGURE 3 | A contextual response-selection task. Visual context is
defined by the configuration (parameterized by the angular distance) of the
two curtains (each with a distinct set of visual cues as shown in the
pictures). For example, context A is defined by the two cue-curtains aligned
at the center (thick arc lines) and context B is when the two cue-curtains
set apart by a larger degree (dotted arc lines).
monitors positioned on both sides of the center touchscreen
monitor. The rats with MUS infused bilaterally in the dorsal hip-
pocampi showed severe performance deficits in the VCRS task
(Kim et al., 2012). The impairment was completely reversible
with vehicle injections. Importantly, the impairment in contex-
tual response selection with hippocampal inactivations occurred
regardless of whether the visual context was presented in the
side monitors or only in the center touchscreen monitor, sug-
gesting that the functional “backgroundness” of large patterned
visual stimuli behind the elemental cues (i.e., response box images
to which the animal should direct its responses) as well as
their roles in resolving ambiguity (Bolles, 1985; Nadel, 2008) in
choice behavior are more important in functionally defining a
hippocampal-dependent visual context than whether the cues are
distally located or not. The hippocampus does not appear to be
directly related to perceptually discriminating the visual patterns
(Morris et al., 2013) because, when the same visual contextual
stimuli were pitted against each other between the two side moni-
tors and as the rats simply ran toward the visual context associated
with reward on a T-shaped track, hippocampal inactivations with
MUS showed minimal disruptions, if any, in performance (Kim
et al., 2012).
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FIGURE 4 | A touchscreen-based contextual response-selection task.
A side view of the LCD-touchscreen apparatus in which two peripheral LCD
screens (only one visible from this particular angle) and the center
touchscreen (showing two adjacent response target rectangles) were
installed to make the rat to choose a particular response using the
surrounding visual context (zebra pattern in this example). The LEDs and
tether attached to the rat are for electrophysiological recording.
In a similar paradigm, we also tested the roles of the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) recently in another version of VCRS
task (Lee and Shin, 2012) in which the animal was required to
either push a sand-filled jar or dig the sand in it to obtain a
piece of cereal reward according to the visual context presented
in the animal’s background through an array of LCD moni-
tors (Figure 5). The rat, therefore, must choose between equally
plausible responses associated with the same object (sand-filled
jar) and only the visual background context determined which
response was appropriate in a given context to achieve goals.
Inactivations of the mPFC severely disrupted the performance in
this task, whereas the same mPFC manipulations failed to impair
performance in simply discriminating the two visual contexts, or
in performing the same task using elemental cues such as tactile
cues instead of visual contexts (Lee and Shin, 2012).
Studies that allow subjects to freely navigate in an open space
(Maaswinkel et al., 1999; Day et al., 2003; Hok et al., 2007;
Goodrich-Hunsaker et al., 2010) as opposed to the ones that
allow only structured movements associated with choice behav-
iors (e.g., radial armmazes) may be considered as a special case of
contextual response selection in which contexts are continuously
monitored and updated and associated responses are also con-
tinuously chosen. However, when an animal continuously move
around, some movements or behaviors arguably may not be the
result of contextual response selection, but may just be bridg-
ing behaviors between critical choice behaviors. It may or may
not be the case but it certainly makes it difficult to examine the
issue when unlimited free navigation is allowed in space. If a
cognitive map is composed of multiple contextual representa-
tions spatially related to each other (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978;
Nadel, 2008), spatial navigation that allows freeform movements
is likely to depend on the cognitive map and its associated path-
integrative information and directional signals (Sharp et al., 1996;
sand-filled
jar
visual context
FIGURE 5 | A contextual response-selection task. The rat is required to
either dig the sand in the sand-filled jar or push the jar to obtain a piece of
cereal. The behavior selection is associated with the visual context
presented in the background using an array of three LCD monitors (partially
shown here).
Redish and Touretzky, 1997; Samsonovich and McNaughton,
1997; Taube, 1998). Discussing such a complex navigation sys-
tem is beyond the scope of this review and readers should refer
to other articles (McNaughton et al., 1996; Redish and Touretzky,
1997; Taube, 1998).
Primate and human studies
Compared to rodent experiments, it is more difficult to test
visual contextual choice behavior in primates and humansmainly
because most experimental paradigms that involve the measure-
ment of brain signals require the subject’s head to be fixed in these
species (thus limiting the possibility of presenting stimuli in the
peripheral background). One of the examples that may be con-
sidered closer to a rodent contextual behavioral paradigm would
be a study done by Wirth et al. (2003), in which a complex nat-
ural visual scene was presented in front of the subject and, after
the scene disappeared, required the monkey to remember one of
four possible saccadic eye-movement responses (up, down, left,
and right) in association with the visual context after a brief delay
(700ms). Although whether viewing a scene in a computer screen
is equivalent to viewing surrounding visual cues in the back-
ground and whether the task is hippocampal dependent should
be investigated further, hippocampal neurons showed neural cor-
relates of learning the scene-response relationships. As in rodent
studies using a radial-arm maze, this study thus required the
subject to perform behavioral response selection on the basis of
a complex visual stimulus with no variable “items” involved as
a target of the response (i.e., physical properties of items were
fixed).
In human studies, combining virtual reality (VR) with
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques has
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provided a unique experimental opportunity that allows test-
ing visual contextual behavior in a goal-oriented experimental
situation that closely resembles the rodent behavioral paradigm
(probably in a way that suits the human visual system). Human
imaging studies provide unique opportunities to observe how
different neural networks in the whole brain change activity pat-
terns simultaneously, which is not currently feasible in rodent
studies. In a VR environment, a visual context is provided by
realistic graphical background images and the visual background
continuously changes as a subject responds to it. In this sit-
uation, a subject can perform a contextual response selection
by indicating right or left turn, for example, by pushing cor-
responding buttons or by manipulating a joystick when he/she
encounters a particular visual scene or context. Many tasks that
may belong to this category used a virtual maze in which egocen-
tric responses were critically required because the subject moved
through alleys connected by several intersections. However, some
of these tasks (Gron et al., 2000; Weniger and Irle, 2006; Weniger
et al., 2010) may not be categorized strictly as for testing con-
textual response selection. This is because turning decisions were
not critically dependent on visual context in the background since
contextual visual background was minimized in some experi-
ments and only textured walls of the maze guided the navigation.
Navigation in such cases may be more guided by the memo-
ries of sequential turns. Nonetheless, the medial occipital gyri,
the lingual gyri, the parahippocampal gyri, the medial and lat-
eral superior parietal lobules, and the hippocampus were usually
activated in these paradigms (Gron et al., 2000; Weniger and Irle,
2006) as illustrated in Figure 6. Some studies addedmore contex-
tual information in the alleys or hallways in the maze by putting
unique objects in hallways and also making each hallway look dis-
tinctively different (Brown et al., 2010, 2012). The task used in
lateral occipital complex
lingual gyrus
retrosplenial cortex
superior parietal lobule 
inferior parietal lobule
hippocampus
parahippocampal gyrus
caudate
precuneus
fusiform gyrus
A
B
FIGURE 6 | An illustration of regions of interest in human VR contextual
response-selection task. Human brain regions (color-coded) that are
consistently activated in contextual response-selection studies. (A) A
posterior view of the brain. Regions of interest (left hemisphere only) were
overlaid with the translucent whole brain. (B) A medial view of the same
areas shown in (A). The regions associated with the colors closer to violet
are sensory and associational cortex (lateral occipital complex, lingual and
fusiform gyri). The regions in green spectrum (inferior/superior parietal
lobules, precuneus, retrosplenial cortex, and caudate) are the areas that are
also frequently activated in a VR navigation task.
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the Stern group’s studies was a semi-VR environment, however,
because a series of still images were presented in response to the
subject’s choice responses (instead of constantly updated scenes in
a true VR environment). The Stern group’s studies also made the
sequence component of navigation critical by putting an overlap-
ping visual context (i.e., identically looking hallway scene) that
needed to be passed by the subject when different navigational
routes were traveled. In this situation, once the subject entered
the overlapping segment of the route, the subject should use
memories of previous paths to make response selection. The hip-
pocampus, parahippocampal cortex, caudate, and orbitofrontal
cortex were activated in this situation (Brown et al., 2010, 2012).
When a distal visual context was provided in the background in
a VR maze environment, navigational strategy-dependent differ-
ences were found between the hippocampus (spatial navigators)
and striatum (STR) (egocentric navigators) in fMRI signals (Iaria
et al., 2003).
The involvement of the posterior parietal lobule and pre-
cuneus consistently reported being active during VR navigation
tasks is worth mentioning. These regions have not been actively
investigated in animal studies especially in rodents (Rogers and
Kesner, 2006; Whitlock et al., 2008; Save and Poucet, 2009) com-
pared to other regions in the medial temporal lobe. Zhang and
Ekstrom found that the levels of activation in these regions were
highly correlated with the retrieval of allocentric spatial informa-
tion (Zhang and Ekstrom, 2012). In their study, subjects were
required to navigate a VR environment in the fMRI scanner in
an originally taught way (i.e., fixed landmark-based) or in a dif-
ferent way (i.e., using spatial relationships among the buildings
presented in a novel fashion compared to the learning condition).
Although the surrounding environment was slightly different
from our definition of context in the Zhang and Ekstrom study, it
does provide some insights into the roles of the posterior parietal
lobule and precuneus. As recently pointed out in a review (Kravitz
et al., 2011), it is possible that the posterior parietal region plays
key roles when moving through space (egocentrically in most
cases as in most human imaging studies in which the allocentric
environment moves in relation to the fixed head position of the
subject) using allocentric visual contextual information (Rogers
and Kesner, 2006; Whitlock et al., 2008; Save and Poucet, 2009).
It is also important to note that the areas in the medial temporal
lobe (including the hippocampus) are connected with the dorsal
visual information-processing stream via the retrosplenial cortex
and posterior cingulate cortex (Kravitz et al., 2011). Further stud-
ies are needed to understand how the posterior parietal-temporal
lobe information streams contribute to contextual behavior.
In VR studies, it is also interesting that the visually impov-
erished conditions (i.e., poor context) made spatial response
selection (e.g., navigation) less efficient and produced some dif-
ferences in the regions of the brain activated for making behav-
ioral choices as compared to the areas for making responses to
contextually rich visual stimuli (Maguire et al., 1998; Rauchs et al.,
2008). For example, in addition to the usual hippocampal-cortical
networks activated in a VR task such as the hippocampus, lingual
gyrus, occipital gyrus, superior parietal gyrus, making behavioral
choice in contextually rich environment wasmore associated with
the activities in the fusiform gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and
cuneus (Rauchs et al., 2008). It is interesting that the parahip-
pocampal cortex (in addition to the hippocampus) was more
recruited when subjects were required to find an alternate route
that deviated from the well-learned route in the Rauchs et al.
study.
CONTEXTUAL ITEM SELECTION
In comparison to contextual response selection, contextual item
selection occurs when an animal needs to direct a single, fixed
response to a certain item (among multiple items) in conjunc-
tion with a specific context in the animal’s background. Context
in this case plays a critical role especially when the same item(s)
appears in multiple contexts, but is rewarded in a certain con-
text only. Importantly, the same response (e.g., pushing an object)
should be emitted in all cases (so devoid of the response-selection
requirement). The response in this case just needs to be directed
toward the correct item considering the environmental context.
Rodent studies
Objects can appear in multiple contexts, but the values attached
to those objects may be contextually different. That will make
the same response (e.g., pushing) to the same object appropri-
ate sometimes but not in other times. For example, Bussey et al.
(2001) tested rats in a double Y-maze in which a pair of objects
was presented in one side of the double Y-maze. At the choice
point of the Y-track, the rats were required to enter the arm that
contained the object associated with reward in a given context.
The rats with lesions in the perirhinal cortex (PER) were severely
impaired in this task and showed no significant improvement
throughout the acquisition period. The PER lesions, however,
left the capability of visually discriminating objects intact (Bussey
et al., 2001), which suggests that the deficits were notmerely based
on impairment in visual recognition for objects after lesions. A
similar experimental paradigm was also applied in a contextual
odor-selection task (Rajji et al., 2006). In a study using trans-
genic mice, Rajji et al. were able to temporally manipulate the
gene for NR1 subunit of the NMDA receptor in CA3 of the hip-
pocampus. The CA3 NR1-deleted mice were impaired in learning
that digging response to a cup scented with odor A, for exam-
ple, was rewarded in context 1, but not in context 2, and vice
versa for odor B. This was the case when scented objects (cups
with scented sand) and contexts were novel, but not for familiar
odors and contexts. The perceptual discrimination of contexts or
items by themselves was not impaired in the NR1-deleted mice.
Komorowski et al. also used the same paradigm in rats and found
the neural correlates for representing the item–context paired
associations in the hippocampus (Komorowski et al., 2009). The
dentate gyrus (DG) appears to be also critical (presumably in con-
junction with CA3) in this contextual odor-selection task because
selective neurotoxic lesions in DG in the dorsal hippocampus also
disrupted the acquisition of the task (Morris et al., 2013).
In our laboratory, we have verified that the hippocampus, pre-
frontal cortex (PFC), and PER play critical roles and interact with
each other as rats are engaged in contextual item-selection behav-
ior. Specifically, we developed a behavioral paradigm in which
different arms of a radial-arm maze were associated with either
an object-in-context rule or a response-in-context rule in order
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to test goal-directed behavior (Lee and Solivan, 2008). Rats were
required to make an explicit choice of an object associated with
reward in a given context (i.e., arm-associated visual cues in the
background). Specifically, a pair of different toy objects was pre-
sented in one of the four arms in a large radial-arm maze with
seven arms (Figure 7). The two objects were placed on top of food
wells in a small rectangular platform at the end of a given arm
and the rat was given only a single opportunity for exposing one
of the food wells covered by the objects (by displacing the object
with its front paw or snout). The configuration of placing the two
objects in a given arm varied from trial to trial. Two of the arms
were associated with the object-in-context rule and, when the rat
entered the object-in-context arms, object identity information
was a critical factor because the rat was required to ignore the
food-well locations associated with the objects and should dis-
place a particular object in that context regardless of whether the
object appeared on its left or right side. If the rat entered one of
the two arms associated with the response-in-context rule, the
rat should ignore object identity because displacing any object
occupying the food well on a particular side of the rat (or over a
particular food well) was rewarded in a given context. The design
of the task thus required the rat to pay attention to (a) the arm-
associated background context for a given trial, (b) the strategy
or rule that was relevant in the context, and (c) specific object or
response information associated with reward in a given context
for obtaining reward.
In our task, since the maze was surrounded by rich visual cues
in the background, rats must pay attention to the visual context
in order to choose a contextually correct object or response. It
is unlikely that rats were dependent more on path integration in
identifying the arms visited because, once exiting the start box,
rats usually explored the center stage (frequently showing rearing
behavior) before finding and entering an open arm. Despite
the seemingly complex task demands with potentially conflicting
FIGURE 7 | A contextual item-selection task. The task requires the rat to
choose one of the objects (inset: toy figures) depending on where in the
maze the two objects appear. The surrounding visual cues on the curtains
serve as a visual context.
strategies (i.e., object-in-context vs. response-in-context) associ-
ated with different contexts, normal rats pre-trained to displace
an object to retrieve a food reward learned the task only in
approximately 1 week on average. The learning curve itself is
interesting because of its non-linear property. That is, rats typ-
ically showed almost 50% chance-level performances for several
days (approximately 6–7 days) but suddenly exhibited a jump
in performance at around day 7 or so during the acquisition.
Such learning curve suggests that the rat experienced an “a-ha”
moment suddenly after several days of having tried to figure out
what the task demands were. This is likely because a typical source
of poor performance during acquisition was the response bias
erroneously associated with object-in-context arms. For example,
when a rat happened to displace a correct object (e.g., object A)
on the left food well in arm 3 (one of the object-in-context arms)
at an early learning stage, the rat appeared to become strongly
inclined to adopt a response strategy almost immediately. That
is, the rat seemed to make an erroneous association and might
“think” that it obtained reward because it turned to the object on
its left side in the context (instead of associating the object identity
with the context and reward). It appears that this dominance of
response bias over object-in-context strategy is an innate bias that
all rats show almost without exception, albeit to different degrees
among individual rats. During the earlier phase of learning, rats
acted as if they were only governed by the response-in-context
strategy but they started to show inhibitory behavior immediately
in front of a wrong object after a few days of training, which was
usually a sure sign that foretold an upcoming performance surge
in the task in 2–3 days.
Rats with axon-sparing excitotoxic lesions in the hippocam-
pus were severely impaired in the task described above and their
performance stayed almost at chance level throughout 10 days of
post-surgical testing (Lee and Solivan, 2008), suggesting that nor-
mal hippocampal function was required in the task. Interestingly,
the performance deficits were more severe in object-in-context
trials than in response-in-context trials with hippocampal lesions.
That is, the lesioned rats showed gradual improvement in per-
formance in response-in-context trials, whereas the same rats
exhibited chance-level performances throughout 10 days of test-
ing in object-in-context trials. The severe performance deficits in
the object-in-context arms was not attributable to impairment in
object recognition because the hippocampal lesioned rats were
normal in discriminating objects when only object recognition
was required without any demand for contextual information
processing. Overall, it is important to note that the hippocam-
pal lesioned rats were normal in simple object discrimination
and also gradually improved when no contextual object informa-
tion processing was required (i.e., in response-in-context arms),
but showed severe and irreversible impairment only in object-in-
context arms where processing object information in the specific
arm context was critical.
In our contextual object memory task (Lee and Solivan, 2008),
the mPFC was also manipulated with MUS in a separate group
of rats. Inactivations of the mPFC with MUS dropped the per-
formance in response-in-context trials down to approximately
80% (as compared to almost perfect performance with saline
injections) on the first day of MUS injection, but the rats still
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performed the task reasonably well. On the next day, however,
the same drug did not affect the response-in-context perfor-
mance any more. In contrast, the MUS inactivations of the
mPFC caused more severe deficits in object-in-context condi-
tions (experienced in the same experimental session with the
response-in-context conditions), producing almost chance-level
performances throughout 2 days of MUS conditions with no
sign of recovery. The more pronounced deficits in the object-
in-context type of trials than in the response-in-context type of
trials suggest that mPFC is necessary for normally disambiguating
object identities using background contextual information in rats.
As demonstrated in the response-in-context trials, the mPFC-
inactivated rats were relatively normal in strategically showing
correct responses (turning to left or right food well) according
to the context associated with a visiting arm and this suggests
strongly that the severe deficits of those rats in object-in-context
trials were not merely due to inabilities of those rats to remember
a context-associated rule or to inhibit inappropriate responses in
the task.
In order to find the neural correlates of contextual object
selection, we recorded multiple single units simultaneously from
the hippocampus and mPFC using the same task. In the unit
recording study, neural firing was recorded throughout the acqui-
sition period until the rats showed asymptotic performances in
order to find neural correlates of task acquisition. Because of the
clearly observable jump in performance during the acquisition (at
around day 7), it was not difficult to draw a boundary between
pre-learning and post-learning stages in the task. Hippocampal
neurons mostly fired in a spatially localized fashion (e.g., arm-
specific place fields) as reported in prior studies (O’Keefe, 1976;
O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Muller et al., 1987). As has been also
reported previously (Breese et al., 1989; Markus et al., 1995;
Kobayashi et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2006), cells heavily repre-
sented the regions where reward-associated events took place.
Object information alone, however, did not significantly explain
the modulation of neuronal firing. This could result from the
possibility that, within the hippocampus, object information is
not represented by itself but always in conjunction with con-
textual information (Komorowski et al., 2009; Navawongse and
Eichenbaum, 2013). Interestingly, there was a transition in the
firing properties of neurons in the hippocampus across learn-
ing stages. As noted in the perturbation studies (Lee and Solivan,
2008, 2010; Jo and Lee, 2010a,b), rats first learned to choose
objects using the contextual response strategy (e.g., choose any
object on the left side in arm 3) at the earlier stage of acqui-
sition in this task. It was more likely to observe the neurons
that fired at higher rates in the trials in which the same turn-
ing responses were observed in a given context (regardless of
object identities) during the pre-learning period than in the
post-learning period. As the rats learned the task and the per-
formance increased during learning, the proportion of neurons
whose firing patterns were modulated by the response-in-context
strategy decreased significantly and more neurons started to fire
at higher rates in their preferred firing locations when the rat was
about to push the contextually correct object irrespective of the
turning directions associated with those choices (Lee and Kim,
2010; Kim et al., 2011). It is known that complex spike neurons
(often characterized as place cells) in the hippocampus modu-
late firing rates within their preferred firing locations (i.e., place
fields) in response to subtle yet significant changes in the animal’s
external and/or internal environment (Hetherington and Shapiro,
1997; Wood et al., 2000; Lee et al., 2006; Leutgeb et al., 2007).
Most of these unit-recording studies were conducted in foraging
situations in which the animal freely moved around in all direc-
tions in order to collect scattered rewards. The results from our
study strongly suggest that, in a goal-directed task, the within-
field firing-rate modulation in the hippocampus is likely to be a
physiological manifestation of hippocampal networks interacting
with other brain regions (e.g., PFC) as spatial context is uti-
lized according to other task-related variables such as objects and
cognitive strategies.
Similar changes in the firing patterns of neurons in the mPFC
across learning support the above conjecture. That is, during
the initial learning of the task, the firing patterns of neurons in
mPFC were critically modulated by the acquisition of the rule.
Specifically, the rats used in the above study were implanted with
a multi-electrode recording drive that could record single units
(as well as local field potentials) from both hippocampus and
mPFC simultaneously (Kim et al., 2011). Although the neurons
in mPFC were not as spatially selective in firing (i.e., arm-specific
firing) as those in the hippocampus, mPFC neurons also showed
the strategy-dependent similarity in spatial firing patterns across
learning as hippocampal neurons did. The increases in object-in-
context-compatible firing patterns in both mPFC and hippocam-
pus were significantly correlated with performance, suggesting
that the mPFC-hippocampal areas work as a unified functional
network for learning how to disambiguate objects using proper
strategy and context information. Also in support of such reason-
ing, when pre-learning and post-learning periods were compared,
more neurons in both mPFC and hippocampus synchronized
their spiking timing with theta rhythms (the same region as well
as from the other region) after the learning occurred only when
the rats showed object-in-context strategy-compatible responses,
but not when the same rats showed response-in-context-based
responses. The proportions of neurons showing significant phase-
locking to theta rhythms during response-in-context trials did
not change, however, between the pre-learning and post-learning
stages (Kim et al., 2011). A recent study has also shown that
mPFC inactivations with MUS disrupt task demand-related fir-
ing patterns in the hippocampus in contextual item selection
(Navawongse and Eichenbaum, 2013).
Interestingly, themPFC neurons were distinguishable from the
hippocampal neurons because more global task demands were
coded in neuronal firing patterns in the mPFC but not in the
hippocampus (Kim et al., 2011). That is, mPFC neurons fired
similarly when the rat experienced the same type(s) of events
between different contexts. For example, more neurons in mPFC
(than in CA1 of the hippocampus) changed their firing patterns
significantly when the rat entered an arm and/or chose an object
regardless of where those events took place. Interestingly, such
specificity in firing associated with a specific event type in mPFC
neurons became more pronounced as learning progressed and
were correlated with performance of the animals, whereas no such
changes were found in CA1 neurons. The results suggest that the
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global task structure (e.g., “when the door opens, go out and enter
an open arm and push the correct object to get reward”) is repre-
sented more prominently in the mPFC (Jung et al., 1998) than
in the hippocampus. Although the electrophysiological correlates
of mPFC neurons in the contextual memory task suggest that the
neural firing in that region ismodulated bymultiple cognitive fac-
tors, it appears that the most critical task demand for recruiting
mPFC is to require animals to choose between discrete responses
to an object with ambiguous meanings (with respect to reward
value) by using the visual context in the background (Lee and
Shin, 2012).
What functions of the hippocampus would make the structure
so critical for processing contextual item information? The con-
textual object-memory task described above required the rats first
to identify the visual context of the environment associated with
a visiting arm because the contextual information was used for
determining the correct strategy and/or correct object informa-
tion in that context. The literature suggests that the hippocampus
is essential for either dissociating or generalizing similar contex-
tual representations (Marr, 1971; McNaughton andMorris, 1987;
O’Reilly and McClelland, 1994; Guzowski et al., 2004; Lee et al.,
2004b; Leutgeb et al., 2004; Vazdarjanova and Guzowski, 2004).
Dissociating similar neural representations is often called “pattern
separation” or “orthogonalization” and the hippocampus appears
to possess anatomically sufficient networks for decreasing overlap
among memory representations. This function of the hippocam-
pus may be critical in representing similar events into unique
event memories. In contrast, it is believed that the hippocampal
networks also perform a seemingly opposite computational func-
tion and it is called “pattern completion” or “generalization” of
neural representations. It is highly likely that both pattern separa-
tion and completion processes were needed for identifying arm-
associated contexts properly in our contextual object-memory
task. Computational models have emphasized the functions of the
DG and CA3 subfields in the hippocampus for pattern separation
and completion processes. Detailed reviews on this topic can be
found in other articles (Marr, 1971; McNaughton and Morris,
1987; O’Reilly and McClelland, 1994; Rolls and Treves, 1998;
Guzowski et al., 2004). Briefly, it has been suggested that both
sparse connectivity between the DG and CA3 via the mossy fiber
pathway and the autoassociative network using massive recur-
rent collaterals within CA3 provide mechanisms with which both
computational processes can be performed dynamically. If the
suggested computational processes are required in our contex-
tual memory task described above, it is predicted that lesions
produced in DG should disrupt the performance in the task
because contextual discrimination should suffer accordingly. So
we tested if DG was necessary in the contextual object mem-
ory task mentioned above. The two arms used in the task were
spaced relatively close to each other in order to create a situ-
ation where DG’s pattern separation became essential (but not
too close to establish good baseline performance). As computa-
tional models have suggested, DG-lesioned rats showed no sign
of improvement in performance from chance level throughout 6
days of post-surgical testing, resulting in virtually the same results
with those observed in total hippocampal lesioned rats. When
the rats were tested with a wider separation between the contexts
associated with the objects, DG-lesioned rats improved perfor-
mance across days as opposed to the sustained deficits observed
in the original condition presumably because less pattern sepa-
ration was required with the wider arm separation. The results
strongly suggest that the deficits in the hippocampal lesioned
rats in the original contextual task were largely attributable to
the loss of DG-CA3 networks although this needs to be verified
with studies involving other subfield (e.g., CA3, CA1) lesions in
the hippocampus. To our knowledge, this is the first experimen-
tal evidence showing that DG is necessary for contextual object
information processing in a goal-directed task (Morris et al.,
2013).
Primate and human studies
A surprisingly small number of studies have been conducted if
only goal-directed memory tasks (but not spontaneous explo-
ration paradigms) are reviewed with the topic of contextual item
selection in primates. Constraining the scope of review using the
definition of context of this review further reduces the num-
ber of studies available for review because this type of context
is difficult to implement in primate studies. Specifically, mon-
keys are often tested using aWisconsin General Testing Apparatus
(Parkinson et al., 1988; Angeli et al., 1993; Malkova and Mishkin,
2003; Belcher et al., 2006) or computer monitors (Cahusac et al.,
1989; Rolls et al., 1989; Rao et al., 1997; Suzuki et al., 1997; Dore
et al., 1998; Charles et al., 2004; Baxter et al., 2007; Bachevalier
and Nemanic, 2008; Wirth et al., 2009), and although item-place
associations might be tested in those settings, the visual context
in the background was often made irrelevant to the task (by dark-
ening the background area). Place information associated with an
object was in this case conveyed by food-well locations in a tray
in front of the monkey’s cage or by locations within a small com-
puter monitor. In such experimental conditions, it is reasonable
to assume that locations of objects were mostly identified using
an egocentric frame of reference (i.e., with respect to the animal’s
body).
The nature of stimuli used in Gaffan group’s studies (i.e.,
object-in-place scene memory task) may qualify those as proper
studies to be reviewed here. That is, an object in the Gaffan’s
paradigm was a small typographic character that can be touched
by the monkey in a computer monitor. A context was a visual
image covering the entire computer screen and served as the back-
ground of the typographic objects. The background image (i.e.,
“scene” according to the Gaffan group) was composed of a ran-
dom number of ellipses and segments of ellipses. The colors,
positions, and sizes of elliptical shapes were randomly deter-
mined by a computer algorithm. The monkey was required to
learn where in the monitor a certain typographic object was
rewarded when a particular scene was presented as a contextual
background. The Gaffan group showed that lesions produced
in the fimbria-fornix (i.e., a fiber bundle that connects the hip-
pocampus to subcortical regions such as mammillary bodies and
thalamus), entorhinal cortex (EC), and orbital PFC resulted in
learning deficits in the task (Gaffan, 1994; Charles et al., 2004;
Baxter et al., 2007). Disconnecting the interactions between the
fimbria-fornix and the PER also produced impairment (Gaffan
and Parker, 1996). The operational definition of the term context
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in this review emphasized the role of context in removing critical
ambiguity in target stimuli (e.g., objects) during choice behav-
ior. Judging from that perspective, the background image used
in the object-in-place scene memory task by the Gaffan group
might have been used as a disambiguating cue. That is, by pro-
viding configural spatial information between the target object
and other background elliptical shapes, the background image
was also used as a spatial cue for helping the rats to determine
whether the target character was in the right place or not for
the purpose of obtaining reward. For the current review, how-
ever, it is arguably difficult to differentiate foreground objects
from the background stimuli in this type of settings because the
elliptical shapes contained in a scene may well be perceived as
objects also.
In humans, only very few studies examined contextual item
selection as opposed to the more frequent usage of the con-
textual response-selection paradigm as described above. Among
those, Burgess et al. (2001) required subjects to navigate in a VR
town. While navigating the town, the subject encountered vari-
ous objects in different visual contexts (e.g., rooms) and was later
required to choose a correct item when cued by one of the visual
contexts. Comparing the contextual item-selection task with a
non-contextual version revealed activations in the precuneus,
parahippocampal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and hippocampus.
Other areas such as the posterior parietal cortex, cingulate cortex,
and the prefrontal cortices also showed significant activations. In
a study done by Hayes et al. (2004), one of the tasks (“spatial trial-
landmark consistent” version) assessed whether a subject could
recognize an item that appeared with a particular visual con-
text in a previously watched movie film. Although there appears
to be some confounds between visual contextual manipulation
and object manipulation in this study (along with a tempo-
ral sequence factor), when compared to other object/temporal
sequence related tasks, the contextual item-selection task acti-
vated the parahippocampal gyrus and PFC more significantly.
A human-patient study (Hannula and Ranganath, 2008) also
used a contextual item-selection paradigm. In the second experi-
ment of the Hannula et al. study, hippocampal lesioned subjects
saw a series of images that contained different items (faces in
this case) overlaid on top of various visual contexts (natural
scenes). After various time lags, subjects were required to recog-
nize the face that had been previously associated with the current
scene when that face was presented with other faces overlaid
with the cueing scene. Hippocampal amnesic patients showed
deficits in this contextual item-selection task irrespective of the
time lags.
CONTEXTUAL ITEM–RESPONSE SELECTION
So far, we have categorized contextual behaviors into two cat-
egories and those were contextual response-selection behavior
and contextual item-selection behavior. There is another type of
behavioral tasks in which these two categories were used in a
mixed fashion. The need for this category of contextual behavior
is related to the type of behavioral task in which only a single stim-
ulus (e.g., object, tone, light) out of multiple candidate items is
presented in a given context per trial and the animal is required to
either respond to the stimulus directly (or to a dedicated response
unit in the apparatus) or to inhibit the response. So it is similar
to contextual response selection, but is different at the same time
because different items need to be recognized.
Rodent studies
For example, Good and Honey used a behavioral paradigm
in which the rat was trained to press a lever in response to
either tone or light stimulus. Each stimulus, however, resulted
in reward only in one context, but not in the other context
(Good and Honey, 1991). Normal rats were able to emit the
lever-pressing responses at different frequencies according to the
stimulus–context paired associations, whereas the hippocampal-
lesioned rats were impaired in doing so. In this paradigm, the
same response should be selectively controlled (thus response
selection involved) in a contextual fashion but also item informa-
tion should be monitored in a discriminative fashion. Compared
to contextual item-selection paradigms mentioned above, the
response in this case was not targeted to an item itself but
to a designated response lever. This situation is more akin to
the representative example Hirsh used when he described how
the hippocampal contextual memory influenced the stimulus-
response “performance line” during the retrieval of associative
information (Hirsh, 1974).
Gilbert and Kesner did a series of experiments on this topic
(Gilbert and Kesner, 2002, 2003, 2004). In their typical behavioral
paradigm, a rat exited a start box located in an area within a circu-
lar open field (i.e., cheeseboard maze) and had to choose whether
to approach and displace (thus response selection between Go
and No-Go responses) an object located in a certain place (or
context) in the arena or not. Two different objects were used
in the experiment and only one of the objects appeared in a
given trial. The object appeared in one of the two fixed locations
in the circular field and each object contained a reward under-
neath it only when it appeared in a particular location. In this
task, as the start box door was opened, the rat saw an object
against a certain visual background in the room because the open
field was not walled off from the environment. This task thus
required contextual item–response selection. Normal rats learned
to approach the rewarding object and to inhibit such responses
to the unrewarded object, whereas electrolytic lesions in the hip-
pocampus completely abolished such learning capability (Gilbert
and Kesner, 2002) as well as performance when lesions were pro-
duced after learning (Gilbert and Kesner, 2004). The same results
were reported when different odors must be discriminated con-
textually (but not when object-odor associations were required).
However, the hippocampal lesioned rats were normal in discrim-
inating objects, odors, and places when tested separately without
any associative demand. The Kesner group also showed that
CA3 in the dorsal hippocampus was critical in learning the task
(Gilbert and Kesner, 2003) presumably attributable to the autoas-
sociative network in that region (O’Reilly and McClelland, 1994;
McClelland and Goddard, 1996; Rolls and Kesner, 2006).
The perturbation studies mentioned so far in this review
mostly tested recognition of contextual item representations
because animals were presented with objects in certain contexts
and they were required to respond to the object-context con-
junctions according to task demands. Some goal-directed tasks,
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however, required cued recall in similar settings (Day et al., 2003;
Tse et al., 2007; Kesner et al., 2008). For example, in the Day
et al. (2003) study, rats were required to learn flavor-place paired
association during a sample phase in a large open field. In the
following test phase, the animal was cued with the flavor that
had been sampled previously in a remote location (i.e., start box)
and was required to revisit the original paired-associate place
on the basis of the olfactory cue sampled. It was shown that
the NMDA receptor-mediated plasticity mechanisms in the hip-
pocampus were critical for normal learning to occur in the task.
Kesner et al. (2008) also used a similar paradigm (but with objects
instead of odors) and reported the importance of CA3 in the
hippocampus. The above paradigms, however, test more than
just contextual object information processing because the tasks
required the animals to “hold” the cue information (e.g., flavor
or object) sampled in the start box in working memory during
the navigational search for the paired associate location after they
exited the start box. Furthermore, the tasks relied on intact nav-
igational capability of rats in open space. In other words, even if
the rat recalled the paired associate location at the time of being
cued by the cueing odor in the start box, it could still produce per-
formance deficits if normal spatial navigation that should guide
the rat to the paired associate location was impaired as a result of
hippocampal perturbations.
We tested recently whether those additional cognitive pro-
cesses mentioned above were critical in testing hippocampal
functions for contextual item–response selection by using a sim-
pler paradigm (Yoon et al., 2012). In our task, the rat just ran
along a straight track (thus with almost no requirement for spa-
tial navigation) upon exiting a start box and encountered a toy
object at the end of the track (Figure 8). The rat was required to
simply choose between the two food wells (covered with identi-
cal metal discs) on both sides of the cueing object. Two objects
were repeatedly used across trials with one of the objects cued
the presence of reward in the left food well and the other object
conveyed the opposite information. The track was located in a
circular curtained area and the curtains were decorated with dis-
tinct visual cues (brightly illuminated with halogen lights) to
maximally encourage the rats to use visual contexts in the back-
ground. The experimental design thus did not require spatial
working memory because the paired reward location was found
adjacent to the cueing object and the track guided the rat to
the object. Although one may predict that this task may have
been solved easily by associating egocentric responses with cue-
ing objects (which is not known to be hippocampal dependent),
surprisingly, inactivation of the dorsal hippocampus with musci-
mol severely disrupted normal performance for two consecutive
days. We confirmed that the rats used visual cues in the back-
ground by showing that rats were not able to do this task in
the dark either with or without hippocampal inactivations (Yoon
et al., 2012). We also showed that rats were able to perceptually
discriminate the cueing objects in the dark (presumably using
tactile information). This task thus meets the requirement of con-
textual item–response selection because two different responses
(left and right turns) must be associated with two different items
(but single item per trial) for reward. Although it can be consid-
ered also as a variant of contextual response selection because it
FIGURE 8 | An object-cued response selection task. The rat exits the
start box and runs along the linear track and encounters an object cue
(orange toy figure in this example). The object signals which disc on its left
or right side should be displaced for successful retrieval of food. Rats are
impaired in this task when the distal visual cues in the background are
removed (by darkening the room).
was more of an item-cued contextual response selection, rats had
no problem in discriminating the cueing objects as well as food-
well location by themselves with hippocampal inactivations. The
results strongly suggest that retrieving object-context conjunctive
representations requires the hippocampus even when additional
cognitive demands were not imposed in a goal-directed task.
Primate and human studies
In the study by the Rolls et al. (2005), monkeys were required
to associate object-displaying monitors with local room con-
texts. The positions of both monkey and monitors were varied
across trials but arrangements were made in such a way that the
monkey could view certain room cues constantly in association
with a particular monitor. There were two monitors in the room
and the monkey should lick a sipping tube for obtaining reward
when object image A, for example, appeared in one monitor, but
should avoid licking the tube (to avoid saline solution) when the
same object image appeared in the other monitor. Another object
image B appeared always with object A but with opposite reward
contingencies (thus making the task a biconditional object-place
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paired associate task). This task thus requires response selection in
conjunction with contextual item information. Object-associated
ambiguity was maximal in the task because the same objects
were used as both positive and negative stimuli depending on
the background room context in which they were presented. It
is important to note that, unlike the Gaffan group’s scene mem-
ory task, the monitor itself did not contain any background image
(only an object cue was shown), thus allowing more straightfor-
ward definitions for objects and contexts in the task. The Rolls
et al. study is exceptional as compared to other primate studies
because object images in computer monitors were associated with
actual room cues in the background as in rodent behavioral stud-
ies. Rolls et al. verified the dominant usage of the room context
(but not egocentric reference frame) in the task by recording “spa-
tial view cells” that responded equally to the monitor positions
even when the monkey’s egocentric relationships with the mon-
itors changed. Neurons in the hippocampus and PER responded
to object identity, the background context in which they appear
(i.e., place), and the combination of those two factors accord-
ing to the study. It is reported in the study that firing patterns
of only approximately 10% of neurons were significantly mod-
ulated by object information both in the hippocampus and the
PER, which is somewhat surprising because the PER is considered
as the major area for representing object identity information
in the medial temporal lobe. What is more interesting in this
study, given that the PER is considered for processing non-spatial
information by many researchers, is that approximately equal
proportions of neurons in the PER responded significantly to
place information as well as to object-place paired associative
information. Rolls et al. emphasized that the results might be
attributable to the recording locations in the brain being at the
boundaries between the posterior PER and parahippocampal cor-
tex. However, it is also possible that the results might reflect the
actual functional firing properties of PER neurons in contextual
object information processing. Except for the Rolls et al. study,
almost all studies using primates used local positions within a
computer monitor or within a testing tray when investigating
object-place associations.
NEURAL CIRCUITS FOR CONTEXTUAL BEHAVIOR
Currently, an influential theory (Fyhn et al., 2004; Knierim et al.,
2006; Furtak et al., 2007; Kerr et al., 2007; Eichenbaum and
Lipton, 2008) posits that contextual background stimuli reviewed
above are represented in the hippocampal formation (hippocam-
pus plus subiculum; HPF in Figure 9) via the rhinal cortical
regions (RhCx in Figure 9) associated with the hippocampus,
including the PER, postrhinal cortex (POR), and EC. Although
the circuits and the types of information processed are often
discussed from the viewpoint of spatial–nonspatial information
processing for memory, we would argue that the same circuits
are involved in processing background contextual information
(red arrows in Figure 9) and item information within the con-
text (blue arrows in Figure 9). Some coarse dissociations have
emerged among the RhCx regions regarding the representation of
spatial vs. non-spatial information (Fyhn et al., 2004; Hargreaves
et al., 2005; Knierim et al., 2006; Brun et al., 2008; Deshmukh
and Knierim, 2011; Deshmukh et al., 2012). That is, the PER
and lateral EC (LEC) carry less spatial information than the
POR and medial EC (MEC). However, it is still largely unknown
how exactly these neural circuits work together to influence the
animal’s behavior in a contextual manner because most of the
physiological studies were performed using non-mnemonic tasks
in which no goal-directed behavioral selection was necessary.
As shown in Figure 9, contextual and item information should
influence the hippocampal subfields and subiculum both seri-
ally (via the trisynaptic circuits from DG to CA1) and in parallel
(via perforant paths independently synapsing onto all three sub-
fields). Computations that occur in the hippocampal subfields
have been experimentally investigated explosively in the last 10
years although most studies heavily focused on spatial contextual
representation (Jung and McNaughton, 1993; Kesner et al., 2000,
2004; Nakazawa et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2004a,b; Leutgeb et al.,
2004, 2005; Vazdarjanova and Guzowski, 2004; Rajji et al., 2006;
McHugh et al., 2007; McHugh and Tonegawa, 2009; Jones and
McHugh, 2011; Yassa and Stark, 2011; Nakashiba et al., 2012).
Apparently, CA3 (with the conjoint effort of DG) plays key roles
in recognizing the original as well asmodified contextual environ-
ments (Marr, 1971; Treves and Rolls, 1992; Rolls, 1996). It would
be rare in natural settings to encounter the same context in exactly
the same physical conditions every time an animal experiences
the context repeatedly (due to differences in lighting conditions,
viewpoint, degradation or loss of some elements in the context,
etc.). For an animal to use contextual memory and learned con-
textual behavior, however, it is critical to reliably identify the
same context despite some minor changes in its surrounding
as well as to recognize some significant differences. The hip-
pocampal circuits appear to perform such critical computations.
The CA3 subfield, for example, contains autoassociative networks
whereby pattern completion recovers the learned contextual rep-
resentation despite some modification/loss/noise in the original
context (Marr, 1971;McNaughton andMorris, 1987; O’Reilly and
McClelland, 1994; Kesner et al., 2000; Lee et al., 2004b; Rolls and
Kesner, 2006). The same network appears to perform non-linear
operations to orthogonalize similar, yet significantly different
contextual information into a separate contextual memory (pat-
tern separation) and the DG subfield seems also critical during
these processes (O’Reilly and McClelland, 1994; Kesner et al.,
2000; Leutgeb et al., 2007). Considering that one of the important
points of this review is to direct the attention to the importance
of understanding the contextual information processing in con-
nection to the animal’s behavioral output, it is worth mentioning
that some critical issues still remain unresolved in the hippocam-
pal research field. Most of all, it still needs to be understood
why CA1 does not normally show CA3-like non-linear repre-
sentational dynamics (between pattern-completed and pattern-
separated states). Some dissociations existing in the literature
between CA1 and CA3 even make this issue more interesting
(Gilbert and Kesner, 2003; Kesner et al., 2004; Lee and Kesner,
2004; Lee et al., 2005; Hoge and Kesner, 2007). Since the brain
structures such as the PFC and STR that may influence the final
behavioral selection or choice more directly receive direct inputs
from the CA1 subfield and the subiculum, but not from DG and
CA3, it still needs to be found how the dynamic representational
changes in DG-CA3 circuits influence the final selection behavior
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FIGURE 9 | A schematic illustration of the information flow and
interactions among the brain regions (selectively chosen) involved in
contextual behavior (connections are simplified for illustrative
purposes). Via primary and higher-order sensory cortices (SCx), multimodal
perceptual information from the environment enters the rhinal cortical regions
(RhCx) that include the post-rhinal cortex (POR), perirhinal cortex (PER),
medial entorhinal cortex (MEC), and lateral entorhinal cortex (LEC). The areas
in the RhCx may interact with each other to varying degrees as indicated by
arrows. It is hypothesized that qualitatively different information-processing
streams exist in the RhCx, denoted by red arrows (contextual information)
and blue arrows (item information) here. The qualitatively different
information streams continue as the information enters the hippocampal
formation (HPF) in which associative processes occur between these two
streams (presumably in order to form an event representation). The
hippocampal subfields (DG, CA3, CA1) and subiculum (SUB) all receive
contextual-noncontextual information in parallel. Serial information processing
across the hippocampal subfields to SUB also occurs at the same time. The
DG-CA3 network (circular arrow indicating the recurrent network in CA3) is
particularly important for recognizing ambiguous/modified contexts in
comparison to memory representations (e.g., rat discriminating different
visual contexts modified from the original ones). The information regarding
the contextual interpretation of the environment and its associated items
then interacts with the fronto-striatal networks (FSL) including the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) and striatum (STR) in a goal-directed manner before final
response behavior is determined (e.g., digging in pebble context here). The
four regions (SCx, RhCx, HPF, and FSL) interact with each other via various
feedforward and feedback connections to realize coherent, inter-regional
bottom-up and top-down communications toward goal-directed behavior.
of the animal in a goal-directed contextual memory task. That
is, what is the functional significance of the hippocampal subfield
computations? It also needs to be determined what the subiculum
exactly do in contextual information processing and the resulting
behavior? Considering that cortical outputs of the hippocampus
are relayed via the subiculum, more efforts should be made to
uncover how the hippocampal information processing influences
its downstream structures in contextual behavior.
The hippocampal subfields should pass the most powerful
contextual representation to various networks in the brain (based
on the research findings so far) and this may the most important
source of information the brain uses to set the mode of operation
in the face of a specific context. The contextual information from
the hippocampus should be useful particularly for those brain
areas whose functions are critical for controlling final action or
response. The PFC and the STR have long been suggested as key
players in this regard. For example, many studies have shown the
roles of PFC in flexible choice behavior (Ragozzino et al., 1999;
Rich and Shapiro, 2007; Roy et al., 2010; Zeithamova and Preston,
2010; Lee and Shin, 2012) and resolving conflicts in response
(Badre and Wagner, 2004; Haddon and Killcross, 2006; Marquis
et al., 2007; Oualian and Gisquet-Verrier, 2010; Horga et al.,
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2011). Contextual behavior presumes that multiple behavioral
responses should be put out conditionally as different environ-
ments are experienced. Therefore, flexible behavioral control in a
contextual manner should be essential and it is not surprising that
PFC is a critical part of contextual behavior in that sense. Since it
has long been shown that PFC does work as a flexible functional
integrator for other domains that are not necessarily by them-
selves contextual (Tomita et al., 1999; Miller, 2000; Miller et al.,
2002), it would be inappropriate to make a statement that PFC
is dedicated for contextual behavior. It is possible that PFC pos-
sesses some capability of influencing how contextual information
is processed in the brain, given the multimodal anatomical con-
nections it maintains with other cortical and subcortical regions
including the hippocampus (Ranganath et al., 2004; Haddon and
Killcross, 2007; Jo et al., 2007; Marquis et al., 2007; Horga et al.,
2011; Euston et al., 2012; Navawongse and Eichenbaum, 2013).
It still needs to be determined what the major differences are
between the hippocampal network and PFC network in terms
of handling contextual information. For example, although the
PFC network may maintain the contextual memory for a lim-
ited duration of time (e.g., several seconds), the hippocampal
circuits are critical for maintaining contextual memory over a
certain period of time exceeding the short-term range (e.g., sev-
eral minutes) based on a previous study (Lee and Kesner, 2003).
It remains to be seen whether there are other key differences
between the two regions with respect to the types of compu-
tations for contextual information (e.g., pattern separation and
completion).
The functions of STR and the cortico-striatal networks
also have long been investigated (Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010;
Ghahremani et al., 2012; Seo et al., 2012; Van Schouwenburg
et al., 2012) with respect to how animals emit and control
proper actions. As has been the case with the hippocampus and
its subfields, the STR is considered as a complex brain region
composed of heterogeneous functional subfields, for example,
responsible for simple/rapid habitual stimulus–response asso-
ciation (McDonald and White, 1993; Packard and Knowlton,
2002; White and McDonald, 2002; Featherstone and McDonald,
2004, 2005), representation of value/motivation-related infor-
mation (Yin et al., 2005; Scimeca and Badre, 2012; Stalnaker
et al., 2012; Tai et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2013), flexible switch-
ing between learned behaviors and task demands (McDonald and
White, 1993; Crofts et al., 2001; Cools et al., 2002; Ragozzino
et al., 2002; Holahan et al., 2005; Eschenko and Mizumori, 2007;
Braun and Hauber, 2011), to name a few. Since the dorsome-
dial STR (dmSTR) receives direct inputs from the mPFC (and
direct visual cortical inputs) and the ventral STR (vSTR) receives
hippocampal inputs (Siegel et al., 1975; Swanson and Cowan,
1977; McGeorge and Faull, 1989; Saint-Cyr et al., 1990; Berendse
et al., 1992; Serizawa et al., 1994; Lopez-Figueroa et al., 1995;
Voorn et al., 2004; Schulz et al., 2009), it is likely that the STR
serves as a critical node for exerting critical influence on pro-
ducing a final behavioral response in association with context.
For example, a habitual behavior in response to a stimulus or
item (presumably represented in the dorsolateral striatum, or
dlSTR) may be contextually expressed via the functional connec-
tion between dmSTR and dlSTR. In fact, this may be the typical
situation Hirsh (1974) used to illustrate how contextual memory
by the hippocampus influenced the stimulus–response perfor-
mance line (i.e., simple stimulus–response associative memory
system) in the brain. Not many studies have studied the STR
in a contextual memory task except for the ones for investigat-
ing the allocentric and egocentric navigations for the relative
contributions of dmSTR and dlSTR between the two type of
navigations (Whishaw et al., 1987; McDonald and White, 1994;
Packard and McGaugh, 1996; Devan et al., 1999, 2011; Packard
and Knowlton, 2002; Holahan et al., 2005; Mizumori et al.,
2009; Brown et al., 2012; Lozano et al., 2013). Some physi-
ological studies have been conducted (Mizumori et al., 2004;
Thorn et al., 2010; Yamin et al., 2013), but more studies are
needed to explore the less well-known aspects of STR func-
tions in representing surrounding visual context and contextual
behavior.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this review, efforts have been made both implicitly and explic-
itly to emphasize the importance of understanding contextual
behavior with the consideration of final goal-related responses.
For example, it is critical to understand how the contextual repre-
sentation in the hippocampus is used by other regions in the brain
such as the mPFC and STR in determining the animal’s behavior
in response to the context. Because the anatomy and physiology
suggest that the circuits are built to influence the information pro-
cessing among these and other contextual behavioral networks
in both feedforward and feedback directions, investigating a par-
ticular neural structure in isolation may result in insufficient
understanding of the network dynamics. As has been empha-
sized in this review, using goal-directed tasks with well-defined
stimulus control is also critical during the investigative endeavor
to answer the critical question of where in the information-
processing stream the neural manifestation of context emerges
as opposed to the representation of a mere sum of elemental
percepts. This theme also echoes in understanding the neural sys-
tems that were previously considered as pure perceptual systems
(Sobotka et al., 1997; Park and Lee, 2000; Poghosyan et al., 2005;
Fenske et al., 2006; Rajkai et al., 2008; Chapuis and Wilson, 2012;
Ley et al., 2012). These motivations led us to selectively catego-
rize the existing literature including our own studies into discrete
categories of contextual behavior mainly by using the criterion
of how context, item, and response to those two components are
interrelated. This scheme may have surely left out some other
contextual behavioral tasks intentionally and unintentionally, but
we reason that investigating contextual information processing
and contextual behavior in an experimental setting with clearly
defined physical stimuli and well-defined purposeful behavior
should take priority over using other paradigms at this stage of
neural investigation of contextual behavior.
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